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O’Neill, oh O’Neill, Wherefore Art
Thou O’Neill : Defining and Cementing




The government may invoke the deliberative process privi-
lege to protect the communications of government officials in-
volving policy-driven decision-making.  The privilege protects
communications made before policy makers act upon the policy
decision to allow government officials to speak candidly when
deciding a course of action without fear of their words being used
against them.
This privilege is not absolute and courts recognize the legiti-
mate countervailing interest the public has in transparency.  The
Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds held that someone
with control over the protected information should personally
consider the privilege before asserting it but did not provide de-
finitive requirements.  It is clear that a department head must as-
sert the privilege, usually through an affidavit.  The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States v. O’Neill, left
room for judicial discretion in determining who counts as a de-
partment head and what would constitute an adequate review of
the materials before asserting the privilege.
This Comment examines the ambiguity in the procedure for
asserting the deliberative process privilege which has resulted in
the adoption of an inefficient and ambiguous process.  Specifi-
cally, whether the court requires an affidavit from a department
head is left to the discretion of the court.  When a party asserts
the privilege without a department head’s approval and with-
holds documents, district courts may either take the asserting
party’s word at face value or conduct an in camera review.  This
Comment argues that taking the claim of privilege from the gov-
ernment gives too much deference to government agencies who
may invoke the privilege inappropriately.  On the other hand, in
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson Law, 2019.
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camera review is a time-consuming process that places the court
in a position to evaluate information that the court sometimes
has little expertise in.  Finally, this Comment asserts the need for
a stricter adherence to the standards set by O’Neill in asserting
the deliberative process privilege in the Third Circuit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 11, 2014, a corrections officer in Blair County,
Pennsylvania allegedly used excessive force against a prisoner.1
Following the incident, the prisoner brought a lawsuit against the
county and filed a request for the production of a Pennsylvania De-
partment of Corrections investigative report related to the inci-
dent.2  Blair County objected to the request on privilege grounds
1. Smith v. Rogers, No. 3:15-cv-264, 2017 WL 2937957, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July
10, 2017).
2. Id.
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and provided a heavily redacted version of the report to the plain-
tiff.3  Blair County’s assertion of privilege prompted the court to
conduct an in camera review of the unredacted investigative report
to determine whether Blair County properly asserted the privilege.4
Blair County relied on the deliberative process privilege5 to protect
the investigative report and, in doing so, failed to follow the proce-
dural rules set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit6 for asserting the privilege.7  Specifically, Blair County
failed to include an affidavit from a department head as required to
assert the deliberative process privilege under Third Circuit prece-
dent.8  Blair County’s failure to follow the procedural rules in as-
serting the deliberative process privilege left the court in the
difficult position of deciding whether the importance of following
those procedural rules outweighed the risk to Blair County Prison’s
security if the court revealed the unredacted documents.9  The
Smith court noted it would need to speculate on the effects of dis-
closure without the required affidavit of the department head.10
Ultimately, the court concluded that portions of the report could
remain redacted in light of the security of the prison but noted that
in camera review was “at best only a partial substitute for the affi-
davit requirement.”11
The deliberative process privilege protects communications
made by decision-makers when deliberating policy decisions.12  But
the government frustrates the transparency upon which a democ-
racy thrives by invoking the deliberative process privilege, or any
executive privilege for that matter.13  The frustration is necessary
sometimes when the government has a legitimate need to keep in-
3. Id.
4. Id. at *4.
5. Id. at *7.
6. See United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 1980).  The head of
the department or governmental agency must personally review the documents in
question and provide both “‘a specific designation and description of the docu-
ments’ claimed to be privileged’” as well as “‘precise and certain reasons for pre-
serving’ the confidentiality of the communications.” Id. (quoting Smith v. FTC,
403 F. Supp. 1000, 1016 (D. Del. 1975)).
7. Smith, 2017 WL 2937957, at *3 (noting that Blair County failed to properly
assert its claim of privilege).
8. Id. at *3; accord O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 226.
9. See Smith, 2017 WL 2937957, at *3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Shilpa Narayan, Note, Proper Assertion of the Deliberative Process Privi-
lege: The Agency Head Requirement, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2008).
13. See generally MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2d ed. 2002) (detailing the conse-
quences of various assertions of executive privilege).
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formation secret, and when revealing such information would vio-
late public policy or even put lives at risk.14
One requirement for the deliberative process privilege is that
the department asserting it should be a department head or some-
one with the authority and intimate knowledge necessary to know
whether the information is privileged.15  The Third Circuit rein-
forced this limitation for invoking the privilege because the Third
Circuit recognized that courts are not in the best position to evalu-
ate highly complex and esoteric issues of policy.16
Yet, circuit courts are split over the use of the department head
requirement.17  The requirements set out in United States v.
O’Neill18 leave much room for judicial discretion in determining
whether or not a department head has adequately reviewed the
materials.19  Prior court decisions have left future courts to make
educated guesses and depend on the reasonableness of discretion to
decide the outcome when the government improperly invokes the
deliberative process privilege.20  The government places the onus
on the court to analyze the policy concerns that support or oppose
disclosure—the undesired outcome that the department head re-
quirement prevents.21  The Third Circuit allows in camera review to
substitute for a department head affidavit in some cases, but mak-
ing in camera review a regular consequence of the invocation of the
deliberative process privilege places both the burden of review and
14. See, e.g., Smith, 2017 WL 293795714, at *3 (suggesting the court is loath to
potentially jeopardize the security of Blair County’s prison by revealing redacted
documents).
15. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953).
16. See United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1980).
17. See, e.g., Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting sister circuits are split whether the department head re-
quirement applies fully to deliberative process privilege); compare Landry v.
FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that lower officials can invoke
the privilege), and Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873, 882–83 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding EEOC subordinate could properly invoke the privilege), with
O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 225 (holding an attorney could not assert the privilege in lieu
of a department head).
18. United States v. O’Neill 619 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1980).
19. See id. at 226 (noting it was not necessary to decide if it is always the case
that an attorney cannot invoke the deliberative process privilege).
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Rogers, No. 3:15-cv-264, 2017 WL 2937957, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. July 10, 2017).
21. See O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 227; see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
1, 10 (1953) (warning against judicial insistence on inspecting documents related to
national security).
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policy decisions on the court.22  Furthermore, regular in camera re-
view invalidates the need and use of a department head require-
ment because, in such an instance, the court conducts independent
review regardless.23
This Comment seeks to address the ambiguous requirements
to assert the deliberative process privilege in the Third Circuit and
proposes that courts should strictly adhere to the standards estab-
lished in O’Neill.  Enforcing the department head requirement
strictly and utilizing a uniform set of factors on which courts can
rely will simplify and ease the burden on the courts to address mat-
ters of deliberative process privilege.24  The risk of losing the privi-
lege due to a technicality provides sufficient incentive for
department heads to review their documents before asserting the
privilege.
Part II of this Comment addresses the background and devel-
opment of the deliberative process privilege from the English com-
mon law to the current law in the Third Circuit.25  Part III of the
Comment assesses the current predicament of the deliberative pro-
cess privilege in the Third Circuit.26  Finally, Part IV assesses the
competing ways that parties to a lawsuit acceptably invoke the de-
liberative process privilege and advocates for a stricter adherence
to the requirements in O’Neill.27
II. BACKGROUND
Some courts consider the deliberative process privilege to be
the most frequently asserted executive privilege.28  The purpose of
22. See Conoco, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 687 F.2d 724, 727–28 (3d Cir.
1982); see also Smith, 2017 WL 2937957, at *3 (requiring the court to conduct in
camera review to determine privilege).
23. Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege,
54 MO. L. REV. 279, 309 (1989).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. See discussion infra Part II.
26. See discussion infra Part III.
27. See discussion infra Part IV; see also United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d
222, 226 (3d Cir. 1980).
28. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975) (noting the deliberative process
privilege is derived from the executive privilege).  Early on, the Supreme Court
identified two types of executive privilege that the executive branch could use to
withhold documents. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974); see also
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1953).  These privileges included the
executive privilege derived mainly from “military, diplomatic, or sensitive national
security secrets” and one involving issues of “broad, undifferentiated claim of pub-
lic interest.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.  These privileges granted to the president are
broad but qualified and not limitless. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542
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the deliberative process privilege is to allow decision-makers to dis-
cuss policy decisions freely before making them.29  Underlying the
privilege is the idea that sound policy decisions require decision-
makers to engage in “‘frank discussion of legal or policy matters’”
and recognizes that releasing records of such debate to the public
may inhibit open and honest discussion.30  Another policy consider-
ation entailed in the deliberative process privilege is the concern
that the public may confuse policy makers’ deliberations with en-
acted policy.31
Parties to a lawsuit can invoke the privilege only for material
which a department produces before a policy maker makes a policy
decision, and the material must be deliberative, meaning contem-
plative, of that policy decision.32  Furthermore, the privilege pro-
tects only opinions and not factual information, even if the factual
information is in an otherwise protected document.33
U.S. 367, 382 (2004) (commenting that the president is not above the law).  Courts
have also granted the privilege of withholding the identity of government infor-
mants to the executive branch. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59–61
(1957).  This privilege has been extended to law enforcement as the law enforce-
ment investigatory privilege which protects investigatory materials including in-
formant identities. See Smith v. Rogers, No. 3:15-cv-264, 2017 WL 2937957, at *3
(W.D. Pa. July 10, 2017); see also In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 270 (D.C. Cir.
1988); see also Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1973).  There
is also an executive privilege related to pending investigations. See Friedman v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1341–43 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The
president is also absolutely immune from civil liability for official acts as part of
the executive privilege. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).  Addi-
tionally, the executive branch is also protected by the attorney-client privilege in
the same way a private entity is. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of
Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
29. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 150.
30. Id. at 150 (citing S. Rep. No. 813, at 8 (1965)).
31. Narayan, supra note 12, at 1194.  A government official may discuss un-
popular policy decisions in the process of determining the proper decision. See id.
The public may confuse the deliberation of an unpopular decision with that offi-
cial’s personal stance. See id.  Consequently, the public official will be discouraged
from the free communication needed in deliberation. See id.
32. Id. at 1184.
33. See Redland Soccer Club v. Dep’t of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d Cir.
1995) (citing In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 959 (3d Cir. 1987)).  Courts have
implied that if a document is protected by the deliberative process privilege, mate-
rial within that document which is factual, rather than deliberative, is not protected
by the privilege insofar as it can be “severable” from material which is delibera-
tive. See id.
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A. History of the Deliberative Process Privilege
1. Origin of Privilege in the Colonies
The concept of privileges has its genesis in the feudal system.34
In the feudal era, when the king granted land to nobles and clergy,
the king would sell immunities to individuals, granting the land-
holders the king’s privileges which protected against liability to en-
courage the landowner to run the property efficiently.35  The
immunities conferred allowed the landowner to punish individuals
on their land, independent of the national justice system.36
The deliberative process privilege is a relatively new privilege,
but elements of this privilege stem from the “crown privilege” of
England in the 18th century.37  Throughout the 19th century, En-
glish courts permitted the use of the crown privilege to protect in-
tragovernmental communications between officials.38  The crown
privilege did not explicitly protect deliberations, but the crown priv-
ilege tacitly included many communications, such as military re-
ports and letters between various levels of government officials.39
The crown privilege persists in England today and operates similar
to the executive privilege of the United States.40
2. Early American Deliberative Process Privilege
Early in the history of the United States, the remnants of the
crown privilege lingered, and courts drew upon the privilege in con-
sidering whether to require the disclosure of information that gov-
ernment officials sought to protect.41  Multiple presidents asserted
the privilege starting with the first, George Washington.42  As the
34. See Thomas Burrell, A Story of Privileges and Immunities: From Medieval
Concept to the Colonies and United States Constitution, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 7,
12–13 (2011).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 17–18.
37. Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 283 n.24 (“‘Crown privilege’ makes
secret such things as parliamentary deliberations, state secrets and papers, confi-
dential proceedings of the Privy Council, and communications by or to public offi-
cials in the discharge of their public duties.”).
38. Id. at 283 n.26 (citing various cases supporting where English courts found
communications of government officials privileged).
39. See id.
40. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939,
945 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (“The law is that the Crown is entitled to full discovery, and that
the subject as against the Crown is not.”).
41. Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 284.
42. The Power of the President to Withhold Information from the Congress:
Hearing on S. 921 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 78–82, 108–12 (1958).  President George
Washington and President Andrew Jackson asserted the privilege against congres-
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role of the executive office and the presidency took shape and the
government delegated more powers to the executive office, courts
applied the privilege to lower government officials.43  Early courts
in the 19th century protected intragovernmental communications
without specific mention to any particular privilege associated with
deliberation or policy-making.44
3. Development of the Modern Deliberative Process Privilege
The deliberative process privilege shares its roots with the de-
velopment of other executive privileges.45  It was not until the 20th
century that the deliberative process privilege fully developed as a
distinct privilege in American jurisprudence.46  The privilege
originated in the common law from the courts but was also codified
for use outside of litigation.47
a. Deliberative Process Privilege as Utilized in Litigation
The deliberative process privilege can be traced to a few Su-
preme Court cases in the early-20th century.48  The Supreme Court
held in Morgan v. United States49 that the courts cannot probe the
internal mental processes of government officials used to make ad-
ministrative conclusions.50
sional inquiries, while President Thomas Jefferson asserted the privilege during the
Burr trials. See id.
43. Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 285 (explaining that the state secrets
and informers privileges encompass some of what is now known as the deliberative
process privilege).
44. See, e.g., Gardner v. Anderson, 9 F. Cas. 1158, 1159 (C.C.D. Md. 1876)
(No. 5,220) (holding a letter to the Secretary of Treasury was privileged because it
was in the course of official duty, relating to the business of their offices); see also
United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 637 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865) (hold-
ing official documents would not be disclosed); Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend.
319, 335–36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) (stating in dicta that a letter from a postmaster to
the Secretary of the Treasury would be privileged because it involves the operation
of the government).
45. See supra Part II.A.1–2.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953).
47. See infra Part II.A.3.a–b.
48. Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 286–87 (citing Morgan v. United States,
304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938), and Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157
F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958)).
49. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
50. Id. at 18 (“[I]t was not the function of the court to probe the mental
processes of the Secretary in reaching his conclusions if he gave the hearing which
the law required.”).  The Court in Morgan dealt with the deliberations of the Sec-
retary of Agriculture in setting prices for market. Id. at 13.  In this role, the Secre-
tary was in a quasi-judicial position making the extent to which the court in Kaiser
could reasonably rely on it questionable. See Narayan, supra note 12, at 1189–90.
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Shortly after Morgan, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Reynolds,51 another seminal case in the development of
executive privilege.52  In Reynolds, the Court established the broad
requirements in asserting executive privilege.53  The Supreme Court
established the requirement that a head of a department, intimate
with the factual matter at issue, must assert the privilege.54  After
the party asserts the privilege with an affidavit from the department
head, the court would then decide whether the circumstances re-
quire the privilege.55  The Court in Reynolds was concerned with
issues of military secrets, but courts have applied the requirements
Reynolds established to all types of executive privilege.56
At the time of the Morgan and Reynolds decisions, the United
States was in the midst of a turbulent political atmosphere.57  Dur-
ing this period, increased scrutiny of governmental officials
prompted the invocation of privilege by President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower and his subordinates during the McCarthy hearings.58  Testi-
mony in the McCarthy hearings revealed that the Eisenhower
Administration held private meetings discussing how to counter the
McCarthy hearings.59  Shortly after Senator Joseph McCarthy be-
came aware of the details of Eisenhower’s meetings, the Eisen-
hower Administration ceased providing information to the Senate
hearings, asserting the deliberative process privilege.60
51. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
52. Narayan, supra note 12, at 1185; see Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United
States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting the agency head requirement
originated in Reynolds).
53. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8 (“There must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after
actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege . . . .”).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Carter v. Carlson, 56 F.R.D. 9, 10 (D.D.C. 1972) (“[I]ts prerequisites
for formal invocation of the privilege have been uniformly applied irrespective of
the particular kind of executive claim advanced.”).
57. See Narayan, supra note 12, at 1191 (referencing the McCarthy hearings);
see also Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliber-
ative Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845, 857–58 (1990).  There was a heightened fear of
communist infiltration in the 1950s, resulting in indiscriminate allegations and
hearings for alleged communist spies. See Paul Achter, McCarthyism, ENCYCLOPE-
DIA BRITANNICA, https://bit.ly/2oYrSpN [https://perma.cc/9HKQ-BXT6].
58. Narayan, supra note 12, at 1191–92.  The McCarthy hearings were hear-
ings conducted in the search for communists operating in the United States Gov-
ernment between 1950 and 1954. See generally 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE,
EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT (1984).
59. Narayan, supra note 12, at 1192.
60. Id. (“Eisenhower remarked in a letter . . . ‘it is essential to efficient and
effective administration that employees of the Executive Branch be in a position to
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK310.txt unknown Seq: 10 24-APR-19 8:02
824 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:815
In 1958, the Court of Claims addressed the issue of whether
internal documents detailing the opinions of a government official
concerning a sale of manufacturing plants were privileged.61  This
case, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States,62 con-
cerned a breach of contract action between a chemical company
and a government agency tasked with liquidating war assets.63  The
source of the privilege debate in this case involved the refusal of a
government agency to release an intra-office policy relating to the
contract with the chemical company.64  The court in Kaiser rea-
soned that the documents were privileged as a matter of public in-
terest because of an important need to protect the “frank discussion
between subordinate and chief concerning administrative action.”65
Consequently, the Kaiser court held that the government asserted a
well-founded privilege and therefore the court withheld the docu-
ments from discovery.66  The court further noted that the “power
must lie in courts to determine executive privilege in litigation.”67
While the court recognized that the commissioner of the court
could determine the issue of privilege in Kaiser, the court noted
that other matters of privilege would best be understood by the of-
ficer most aware of the needs of the government in showing the
preliminary executive interest in privilege.68  Justice Reed, the pre-
siding judge in Kaiser, relied upon the decisions of Morgan and
be completely candid in advising with each other on official matters.’”) (citing Let-
ter from Dwight Eisenhower to Secretary of Defense (May 17, 1954) (on file with
author)).
61. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939,
943–44 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
62. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct.
Cl. 1958).
63. Id. at 941.
64. Id. at 943.
65. Id. at 946.
66. Id. at 948.
67. Id. at 947.
68. See id.  In considering the need for examination of the privileged docu-
ment, the court held:
To require it here would mean the creation of an absolute right for judi-
cial examination and determination of all evidence whose discovery the
executive deemed contrary to the public interest.  If executive determina-
tion is to be merely preliminary, the officer and agency most aware of the
needs of government and most cognizant with the circumstances sur-
rounding the legal claim will have to yield determination to another of-
ficer less well equipped.  Circumstances may require such a course.  This
should not be ordered without definite showing by plaintiff of facts indi-
cating reasonable cause for requiring such a submission.
Id. at 947–48.
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Reynolds in reaching his decision, noting the cases presented similar
circumstances to the instant matter.69
Another aspect of Kaiser, revealed by Professor Gerald Wet-
laufer’s analysis, is the suggestion that courts arrived at the deliber-
ative process privilege not only through the crown privilege but
partly through the doctrine of sovereign immunity.70  Mere months
after the decision in Kaiser, the Supreme Court ruled against al-
lowing sovereign immunity to limit the scope of discovery, sug-
gesting that when the government is a litigant, the government must
abide by the same procedural rules as all other litigants.71
The courts further strengthened the executive privilege during
President Richard Nixon’s term.72  The Supreme Court recognized
that the executive privilege is a constitutional right in United States
v. Nixon73 based on the separation of powers and the need for in-
tragovernmental confidential communication.74  Because the delib-
erative process privilege stems from executive privilege, the Court
also recognized the deliberative process privilege as a constitutional
right.75  The Court recognized the executive privilege protecting
President Nixon’s deliberations as a qualified one.76  However, the
69. Id. at 946.
70. See Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General De-
liberative Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845, 873 (1990).
71. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958).
72. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
73. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
74. See id. at 703.
75. Id.; Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 288.  Scholars and courts debate
whether the deliberative process privilege is rooted in the common law or in the
Constitution. See id.  Some courts have posited that the basis of the deliberative
process privilege exists separately from the Constitution based on the common-
sense notion that not all public business should be discussed in the open. See, e.g.,
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring); In re
Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986).  At
least one scholar has argued that no aspect of the executive privilege is based in
the Constitution. See Maurice Holland, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional
Myth, by Raol Berger, 50 IND. L. J. 193 (1974) (book review).  However, district
courts have treated the mental process protection in the deliberative process privi-
lege as constitutionally based. See, e.g., In re Franklin Nat’l Sec. Litig., 478 F.
Supp. 577, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).  It stands to reason that it is proper to hold that
because the Nixon Court held the executive privilege to be derived from the Con-
stitution, and the deliberative process privilege arises from the executive privilege,
at least some aspect of the deliberative process privilege is derived from the Con-
stitution. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 288–89.
76. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706 (“[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers,
nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial
process under all circumstances.”).  The Court recognized that the privilege that
the executive holds is qualified insofar as it is limited to specific situations, which
allows the Court to hold the privilege did not protect against the specific instance
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link between the executive privilege as seen in Nixon and courts
have questioned the deliberative process privilege due to the
unique nature of the Office of the President.77
In the year following the decision in Nixon, the Supreme Court
decided NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.78 which, while not using
the term “deliberative privilege,” recognized the need to protect
the deliberation of government officials.79  The Court distinguished
between pre-decisional communications, which are privileged, and
post-decision communications, which are not.80
In the early 1970s, the Federal Rules of Evidence advisory
committee attempted to codify the deliberative process privilege.81
The advisory committee made multiple drafts of the proposed codi-
fied deliberative process privilege between 1969 and 1973.82  During
this time, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the advisory com-
mittee discussed what standard of harm the government would
have to demonstrate to pass the bar for the proposed rule to avoid
the disclosure of secrets.83  Had the legislature accepted the rule,
the 1973 version of the rule would have set the standard articulated
of demonstrated need found in Nixon, as well as allowing future courts to refine
what exactly executive privilege protects. See id.
77. Wetlaufer, supra note 70, at 901–02.  Wetlaufer suggests that presidential
deliberations are distinct from the general deliberative process privilege because
the position of president is a special one which deserves deference over the lower-
ranked offices. Id.  Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution recognizes the offices of
president and vice president specifically while the constitution does not recognize
the lower offices. Id.
78. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
79. Id. at 150.  Specifically, the Court noted:
Manifestly, the ultimate purpose of this long-recognized privilege is to
prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions. The quality of a particu-
lar agency decision will clearly be affected by the communications re-
ceived by the decisionmaker on the subject of the decision prior to the
time the decision is made.
Id. at 151.  The Court addressed exemption five of the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018), but discussed the contours of the need to protect the
deliberation of policy decisions. Id.
80. Id. at 152 (“This distinction is supported not only by the lesser injury to
the decisionmaking process flowing from disclosure of postdecisional communica-
tions, but also, in the case of those communications which explain the decision, by
the increased public interest in knowing the basis for agency policy already
adopted.”).  For the purposes of privilege, pre-decisional communications are com-
munications made before policy decisions by public officials. Id.
81. Anthony Rapa, Comment, When Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v.
Department of Justice and a Proposal to Reform the State Secrets Privilege, 37 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 233, 251 (2006) (discussing the development of the failed FED.
R. EVID. 509).
82. Id. at 252–53.
83. Id. (noting the DOJ argued for a lower standard such as the classification
of the document be conclusive on the issue of state secrets).
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in Reynolds into a statute, requiring that a department head or
agency head assert the privilege.84  The proposed rule went to a
vote at the same time that the Watergate scandal broke.85  Natu-
rally, Congress hesitated to codify privileges for the executive while
engaged in a conflict with a sitting president concerning the with-
holding of information.86  Ultimately, Congress voted down the
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence.87
b. Deliberative Process Privilege Outside of Litigation
Outside of the scope of litigation, the deliberative process priv-
ilege applies to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).88  FOIA
provides a process for any person to request information that the
United States government is in possession of but has not released
and requires the disclosure of that information unless a privilege
protects the information.89  There are a number of exemptions to
FOIA, but FOIA incorporates the deliberative process privilege
into exemption five which applies to “intra-agency memorandums
or letters.”90  Courts interpret the purpose of the FOIA as provid-
ing the public with a “broad spectrum of information.”91  However,
FOIA provides limits in exemption five for the same reason that
courts limit discovery by the deliberative process privilege at com-
mon law.92  That reason is to protect both deliberative materials as
well as deliberative process of executive agencies and to allow agen-
84. Id. at 254.
85. Id. at 255.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018); Narayan, supra note 12, at 1195.
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
90. Id. § 552(b)(5).  FOIA includes nine enumerated exemptions. Id.
§ 552(b).  The first exemption is for matters authorized by “[e]xecutive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense.” Id. § 552(b)(1)(A).  The next ex-
emption is for material related “solely to the internal personnel rules and practices
of an agency.” Id. § 552(b)(2).  FOIA also includes an exemption for any material
specifically exempted by another statute subject to qualification. Id.
§ 552(b)(3)(A)–(B).  FOIA also includes exemptions for trade secrets and finan-
cial information, and personnel and medical files in § 552(b)(4)–(5), an exemption
similar to the Law Enforcement Privilege which protects “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes,” and an exemption for “geological and
geophysical information and data,” in § 552(b)(9).  The last of FOIA’s exemptions
is the exemption for “examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on
behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision
of financial institutions.” Id. § 552(b)(8).
91. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 74 (1973).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); Mink, 410 U.S. at 89–91.
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cies to deliberate on policy matters free of the fear of disclosure.93
FOIA is not explicitly a part of the deliberative process privilege
but overlaps concerning deliberative materials, and therefore has
been a significant consideration in deliberative process
jurisprudence.94
B. Deliberative Process Privilege Now
The deliberative process privilege is a common-law privilege.95
The privilege protects executive officials from disclosure of infor-
mation in discovery.96  The general common-law deliberative pro-
cess privilege requires only that the information be pre-decisional
and deliberative.97  As a consequence, information which is purely
factual or relating to an existing policy already implemented is not
covered by the deliberative process privilege.98
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a party respond-
ing to requests for the production of documents to state “with spec-
ificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the
reasons.”99  An objection must also specify what the objecting party
is withholding and, if the objecting party only partially withholds an
item, permit the court to inspect what the party is withholding.100
If a party claims a privilege, the party claiming the privilege
must, usually through a privilege log, expressly assert the privilege
and describe the material the party withholds in such a way as to
allow other parties to assess the merit of the privilege without re-
vealing the privileged information.101  The party claiming any privi-
lege must assert more than a bare conclusion to ensure that the
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, 150 (1975); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
94. See Narayan, supra note 12, at 1193.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  The material
which is privileged must be made before policy decisions are carried out, com-
monly referred to as “predecisional” material, and must be made in the course of
deliberating over those decisions. Id.  Deliberative materials “reflect[ ] the advi-
sory and consultative process by which decisions and policies are formulated.”
Army Times Publ’g Co. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 998 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
98. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737.
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C); see, e.g., Smith v. Rogers, No. 3:15-cv-264,
2017 WL 544598, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2017) (producing a partially redacted
requested document for inspection).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A).  The privilege log is an accounting of the
material being claimed privileged and the reason the party is asserting the privilege
as required by Rule 26. Id.
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court can accurately assess whether or not the claim of privilege is
legitimate.102  The government bears the initial burden of showing
the necessity of the deliberative process privilege.103  These rules
are consistent in every jurisdiction but their application varies be-
tween jurisdictions.104
C. Deliberative Process Privilege in the Third Circuit
In United States v. O’Neill, the Third Circuit established proce-
dural requirements that the government must satisfy to assert the
privilege.105  Specifically, the head of the department or agency at-
tempting to assert the privilege must personally review the material
the party seeks to protect and provide the court with both a “spe-
cific designation and description” of the material and “‘precise and
certain reasons for preserving’ the confidentiality of the communi-
cations.”106  The court further noted in O’Neill that an assertion of
the privilege should include an affidavit claiming the department
head reviewed the documents properly.107
Once the court evaluates the sufficiency of the asserted privi-
lege, the court conducts a two-step review of the material.108  “First,
[the court] must decide whether the communications are in fact
privileged.  Second, the court must balance the parties’ inter-
ests.”109  However, not all courts follow this process in the same
way.
D. Differences Within the Third Circuit Procedural Requirement
1. Department Head Requirement
District courts in the Third Circuit have generally held that a
department head must assert the deliberative process privilege
102. See Schreiber v. Soc’y for Savings Bancorp, 11 F.3d 217, 221 (D.D.C.
1993) (holding that courts retain the discretion to determine if a factual portion of
a document protected by the deliberative process privilege cannot be separated).
103. Redland Soccer Club v. Dep’t of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d Cir.
1995).
104. See source cited supra note 17.
105. See United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 1980); see also
Schreiber, 11 F.3d at 221.
106. O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 226 (quoting Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1016
(D. Del. 1975)).
107. Id.  The court in O’Neill asserted that it was not deciding if it was always
the case that the department head must personally review the documents. Id.
(“We need not decide if this is always the case . . . .”).
108. See Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 854.
109. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK310.txt unknown Seq: 16 24-APR-19 8:02
830 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:815
rather than solely counsel.110  Some courts have declined to grant
the privilege when the government failed to show that a department
head made the kind of careful examination required to assert the
deliberative process privilege.111  The Third Circuit emphasizes that
an “indiscriminate claim of privilege may in itself be sufficient rea-
son to deny it.”112  Such an indiscriminate claim makes it impossible
for the court to make just assessment of the legitimacy of a claim of
privilege.113  Furthermore, a District Court in the Western District
of Pennsylvania suggested that a failure to include an affidavit from
a department head “could be fatal to [its] claim of executive
privilege.”114
Historically, courts have waived the department head require-
ment when in camera review presented a viable solution to deter-
mining the validity of a claim of privilege.115  Courts in the Third
110. See, e.g., Griffin-El v. Beard, No. 06-cv-2719, 2009 WL 678700, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2009) (noting a lack of specificity and no indication by affidavit
or otherwise that a department head reviewed the documents at issue); Startzell v.
City of Phila., No. 05-cv-5287, 2006 WL 2945226, at *2 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2006)
(noting there is a clearly established protocol when documents are at issue as op-
posed to testimony); Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (requiring the Commissioner of the IRS to assert the deliberative process
privilege).
111. See, e.g., O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 226. O’Neill involved a claim against city
officials for alleged police brutality. Id. at 224.  The appellant, the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission, served upon the appellee city officials administrative subpoe-
nas which prompted the appellees to assert deliberative process privilege.  Id. at
225–26.  Appellees asserted the privilege through an attorney and not in writing.
Id.  The court in O’Neill held that the manner of assertion for the privilege was
insufficient without a written assertion and without a department head’s affidavit.
Id. at 231; see also Lee v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., No. 09-cv-210, 2009
WL 1607900, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 8, 2009).  The plaintiffs in Lee attempted to
enforce a subpoena for production of documents from Allegheny County. Id. at
*1.  Allegheny County asserted the deliberative process privilege initially without a
department head affidavit and was given time to comply with the requirements by
the court.  Id. at *1.  Allegheny County responded with an affidavit not from the
department head but from a supervisor. Id.  While the court in Lee rejected Alle-
gheny County’s claim of privilege on other grounds, it noted that the deficiencies
in their deliberative process privilege claim “alone could be fatal to Allegheny
County’s claim of executive privilege.” Id. at *1–2.
112. O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 227.  The court noted in O’Neill that the city indis-
criminately asserted the privilege in ways which were impossible. Id. at 226.  For
example, the city attempted to invoke the Fifth Amendment for the protection of
documents, but the Fifth Amendment in this context is a personal claim of privi-
lege and there was no indication that the Commissioner was personally claiming
protection from self-incrimination. Id.
113. Id.
114. Lee, 2009 WL 1607900, at *1.
115. E.g., Harris v. City of Phila., No. CIV.A. 82-1847, 1995 WL 350296, at *8
(E.D. Pa. June 6, 1995); Conoco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 687 F.2d 724, 727–28 (3d
Cir. 1982).
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Circuit have inconsistently applied the waiver by in camera re-
view.116  In the Third Circuit, courts faced with an improperly as-
serted privilege have been typically cautious to deny a party the
protection afforded by the deliberative process privilege purely be-
cause of a technicality of procedure such as the failure to submit an
affidavit by a department head.117
2. Balancing Test
After determining that the privilege was properly asserted and
has merit, the court must balance the policy considerations and ne-
cessity of the privilege with the need for the evidence by the party
requesting it.118  Lower courts within the Third Circuit rely on two
different factor tests; some use a ten-factor test and the others use a
five-factor test.119  For courts employing the ten-factor balancing
test, a court weighs:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental
processes by discouraging citizens from giving the government
information;
(2) the impact upon persons who have given information of hav-
ing their identities disclosed;
(3) the degree to which governmental self-evaluation and conse-
quent program improvement will be chilled by disclosure;
(4) whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative
summary;
(5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an actual or poten-
tial defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending or rea-
sonably likely to follow from the incident in question;
116. Compare Conoco, 687 F.2d at 727–28 (holding affidavits submitted by
solicitor at DOJ was sufficient for in camera review), with Lee, 2009 WL 1607900,
at *1 (holding that privilege assertion made by an attorney, even with in camera
review, was not enough to assert the privilege).
117. See Smith v. Rogers, No. 3:15-cv-264, 2017 WL 544598, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
July 10, 2017) (allowing the assertion of the privilege despite a lack of considera-
tion by a department head); see also Crawford v. Dominic, 469 F. Supp. 260, 264
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (“A court should be wary of dismissing possibly meritorious claims
for such a technical reason, especially where important interests of the public at
large may be involved.”).
118. See Redland Soccer Club v. Dep’t of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d Cir.
1995); see also United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1980) (requiring
the court to balance on one hand the policies which give rise to the privilege and
their applicability to the facts at hand against the need for the evidence sought to
be obtained in the case at hand).
119. Compare Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(using a ten-factor balancing test), with Chisler v. Johnston, 796 F. Supp. 2d 632,
640 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (using a five-factor test).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK310.txt unknown Seq: 18 24-APR-19 8:02
832 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:815
(6) whether the police investigation has been completed;
(7) whether any intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have
arisen or may arise from the investigation;
(8) whether the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and brought in
good faith;
(9) whether the information sought is available through other
discovery or from other sources; and
(10) the importance of the information sought to the plaintiff’s
case.120
Courts give the most weight to the importance of the informa-
tion sought for the plaintiff’s case as a factor.121
The five-factor test is similar in theme but the streamlining of
the factors into only five results in a test that demands less specific-
ity.  It includes:
(i) the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected;
(ii) the availability of other evidence;
(iii) the “seriousness” of the litigation and the issues involved;
(iv) the role of the government in the litigation; [and]
(v) the possibility of future timidity by government employees
who will be forced to recognize that their secrets are violable.122
III. ANALYSIS
Courts have never held the application and procedure of the
agency head requirement for asserting the deliberative process priv-
ilege to be fully established.123  The language of the leading Su-
preme Court decision left a lot of room for discretion by asserting,
“The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are ap-
propriate for the claim of privilege . . . .”124  Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has not made the proper form of the department head
requirement explicitly clear; some courts hold that an affidavit is
120. Frankenhauser, 59 F.R.D. at 344; see also Lee, 2009 WL 1607900, at *1.
121. See Crawford, 469 F. Supp. at 263 (citing Culp v. Devlin, 78 F.R.D. 136,
139–41 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
122. Chisler, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (quoting Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at
854).
123. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 307–09 (listing the different ways
courts have chosen to handle the department head requirement); see also Marriott
Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting
the split within the circuit regarding the department head requirement).
124. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).  The Court in Reynolds
also noted that this requirement is the one that presents the most difficulty. Id.
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not necessarily the only means.125  Increasingly, courts have aban-
doned the department head requirement altogether and instead
conduct in camera reviews to determine the legitimacy of a claim of
deliberative process privilege.126  Further conflict between courts
arises from the interpretation and application of who constitutes a
“department head.”127  Regardless of whether the department head
meets the affidavit requirement or a court uses in camera review,
courts in the Third Circuit employ two different sets of factors to
determine whether or not the information shall remain pro-
tected.128  The lack of uniformity is a burden on judicial resources
because it forces the court to conduct in camera review more fre-
quently.129  If courts applied a more stringent and uniform stan-
dard, they would benefit and the standard would provide clarity to
litigants.
Part III.A argues for stricter adherence to the standards estab-
lished by O’Neill by consistently requiring an affidavit by a depart-
ment head for cases filed in the Third Circuit.  Part III.B discusses
what positions constitute department heads.  Part III.C briefly dis-
cusses the need for a uniform set of factors to determine whether or
not a party properly invokes a privilege.
A. Consequences of Failing to Apply the Department Head
Requirement
Courts often use in camera review as an alternative to the de-
partment head requirement.130  In camera review is the review of
documents in chambers, usually for the purposes of determining the
admissibility of evidence based on matters such as privilege and rel-
evance.131  Conducting in camera review can involve a lengthy re-
125. See United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Usually
such claims must be raised by affidavit.” (emphasis added)).
126. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 310.
127. See O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 226 (requiring more than a mere supervisor to
assert the deliberative process privilege); see also Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125,
1135 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (allowing someone who was not at the very top of an agency
to fulfill the department head requirement).
128. Compare, Redland Soccer Club v. Dep’t of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 854
(3d Cir. 1995) (employing a five-factor test), with Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59
F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (employing a ten-factor test).
129. See Narayan, supra note 12, at 1206–07.
130. See, e.g., Smith v. Rogers, No. 3:15-cv-264, 2017 WL 544598, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. July 10, 2017) (employing in camera review in absence of a department head
affidavit); see also U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Brett, 659 F.2d 154, 155 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that an affidavit is only required in absence of in camera
review); Ass’n for Women in Sci. v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 347–48 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
131. See In camera, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2012).
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view of sizeable documents to determine, line by line, whether each
sentence is privileged or not.132  Employing an in camera review
standard places a large burden on courts which slows the litigation
process, especially when compounded by the number of parties that
could invoke the privilege.133  If a party disregards the department
head requirement and merely submits the claim of privilege, the
court has no other choice than to conduct an in camera review be-
cause the court lacks any assurance from a department head that
the privilege is necessary.
Without a department head affidavit, the court could blindly
accept a claim of privilege without review for the sake of judicial
economy, but this standard would inevitably lead to the govern-
ment improperly protecting documents under the guise of the delib-
erative process privilege.134  In addition, even if in camera review
will always be necessary when a party invokes the deliberative pro-
cess privilege, the department head requirement exists to ensure
that the party did not claim documents to be privileged carelessly,
which helps avoid wasting the court’s time.135
Scholars such as Weaver and Jones disagree with the necessity
of the department head requirement and argue that it is superfluous
considering the increased reliance on in camera review.136  How-
ever, Weaver and Jones ignore the stated purpose of the depart-
ment head requirement, which is to ensure that a department head,
who is in the unique position to have personal knowledge on the
subject, reviewed the material and gave a specific description of
what a party claims is privileged as well as certain reasons to pre-
serve the confidentiality of the communications.137  After all, par-
ties invoking the deliberative process privilege are in the position to
conceal the actions and inner workings of the government from its
132. See, e.g., Smith, 2017 WL 544598, at *3 (requiring the court to evaluate
documents in camera).
133. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 303; see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484
F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting such an examination would be overly bur-
densome without some argument to illuminate the importance by the party assert-
ing a privilege).
134. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706–07 (1974) (noting the need
for qualified executive privilege rather than absolute and unqualified privilege).
135. See United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing
Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Del. 1975)).
136. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 310; see also Founding Church of
Scientology, Inc. v. FBI, 104 F.R.D. 459, 465–66 (D.D.C. 1985).
137. See, O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 226; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy,
102 F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 97 F.R.D. 749,
752 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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citizens, and departments should not lightly invoke the privilege.138
Transparency and accountability are pillars of democracy, and the
assertion of a privilege over information by public entities slowly
erodes this pillar.139
The department head requirement also encourages a more po-
litically responsible outcome when parties attempt to assert the
privilege because those with the most responsibility in the depart-
ment would be asserting it.140  The “master” of a department is in a
better position to understand the political consequences of asserting
or not asserting the deliberative process privilege in any given
situation.141
The trend may be, as some scholars have suggested, that in
camera review is a sufficient and preferable replacement for the de-
partment head affidavit requirement.142  In camera review may
even be necessary in many cases.  However, courts should properly
view it as supplemental to the procedure of asserting deliberative
process privilege where courts employ in camera review only as
necessary after the department head requirement is met.143
B. Application and Adherence to the Department Head
Requirement
Courts have had a difficult time discerning who would consti-
tute a department head for the purposes of asserting the delibera-
tive process privilege.144  Solving this problem uniformly would
make the department head requirement much more viable.
138. See O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 227; see also Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 91
F.R.D. 26, 43 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see also Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514,
518 (D. Del. 1980).
139. See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1253, 1254 (2009) (“Modern public law is strongly devoted to the notion that
public officials should be held ‘accountable’ for their decisions.”).
140. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953) (requiring the affidavit to
come from the political head); Duncan, 86 F.R.D. at 518 (noting the affidavit did
not come from a politically responsible party).
141. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 97 F.R.D. 749, 752 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
see also Pierson v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 384, 395 (D. Del. 1977).
142. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 23, at 310.
143. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318,
330–33 (D.D.C. 1966), aff’d sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d
979 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding in camera inspections appropriate only when non-
asserter demonstrated right to disclosure and a dispute).
144. Compare United States v. Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 637 (D.D.C.
1980) (holding affidavit need not be sworn by the head of an agency but one who
has delegated authority), with O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 226 (holding that a police super-
visor was not a department head).
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Some courts hold that the personal consideration required by
the deliberative process privilege can be accounted for in subordi-
nates when a department head relies upon the advice of those sub-
ordinates.145  Other courts have held that department heads can
delegate their review authority to subordinates, who may constitute
either other high-level officials or lower-level subordinates with
strict guidelines.146  The ambiguity lies in the complex nature of
agencies and their personnel structures, making it difficult to dis-
cern who, outside of the top executive office, would have proper
authority and knowledge to assert the deliberative process
privilege.147
An agency could assert the privilege with minimal risk of abuse
if courts required them to make a showing of content guidelines
that they implemented when invoking the privilege.148  However,
these content guidelines still leave the determination to the discre-
tion of the courts to guess what those types of guidelines should
look like.149
The most consistent position for courts to take would be that
which the O’Neill court took.150  As the court in O’Neill held, de-
partments should assert the deliberative process privilege with an
affidavit by a department head, not a subordinate, showing contem-
plation and scrutiny over the material they are seeking to pro-
tect.151  The government should not invoke the deliberative process
privilege lightly, especially if the material under review is not re-
lated to national security and military secrets as was the case in
Reynolds.152  Only the highest-level department head of an agency
can truly be accountable to assert the deliberative process privilege
with the consideration and intimate knowledge required.153
145. See Peck v. United States, 88 F.R.D. 65, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding the
Attorney General properly asserted the deliberative process privilege despite not
having personally reviewed the considered documents).
146. See Mobile Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 102 F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D.N.Y.
1983) (permitting high level subordinates to satisfy the department head require-
ment); see also Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 91 F.R.D. 26, 44 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(holding department head requirement not needed if case-specific content guide-
lines which will insure appropriate and consistent assertion are present).
147. See Narayan, supra note 12, at 1203.
148. See, e.g., Exxon Corp., 91 F.R.D. at 44; see also Coastal Corp. v. Duncan,
86 F.R.D. 514, 518 (D. Del. 1980).
149. Cf. Exxon Corp., 91 F.R.D. at 44.
150. See O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 226 (requiring an affidavit from the head of the
department).
151. Id.
152. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953); see also Weaver &
Jones, supra note 23, at 309.
153. See O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 226.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The deliberative process privilege provides an avenue to pro-
tect the legitimate deliberative processes of government officials.154
The government can also invoke it without cause in the hopes that
the court will protect otherwise discoverable documents from enter-
ing the hands of adverse parties.155  Courts have developed safe-
guards to protect against the possibility of abusing the privilege.156
The main protection against abuse of the privilege is the depart-
ment head review requirement and the in camera review that courts
may conduct.157
In camera review has been an intuitive option for courts evalu-
ating whether material should not be discoverable, but it is not al-
ways an option if the protected material concerns national
security.158  The Supreme Court developed the department head re-
quirement to account for material so sensitive that even the court
should not review it, but it also applied equally for material that the
court could review in camera.159  The department head requirement
applies because in camera review is burdensome on the courts and,
even when conducted, the disputed documents may be of an eso-
teric nature such that the court cannot properly evaluate them.160
The court’s inability to properly evaluate the privileged material is
why a careful consideration of potentially privileged material must
be done by someone intimately familiar with the subject matter,
and the government should make the court aware of that evaluation
and its analysis through an affidavit.161
There is no uniform standard for what a department head is.162
Some courts have held that a subordinate may assert the privilege
with the department head’s permission, while other courts have
held only someone at the top of an organization may assert the
privilege.163  A test based off of the locus of relevant knowledge or
154. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8.
155. See Smith v. Rogers, No. 3:15-cv-264, 2017 WL 544598, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
July 10, 2017).
156. See Narayan, supra note 12, at 1206–07; see also Reynolds, 345 U.S. at
7–8.
157. See Narayan, supra note 12, at 1206–07; see also Reynolds, 345 U.S. at
7–8.
158. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
159. Id. at 11–12.
160. See supra Part III.A.
161. See supra Part III.A.
162. See Narayan, supra note 12, at 1203.
163. Compare, e.g., Peck v. United States, 88 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(holding the Attorney General properly asserted the deliberative process privilege
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policy-making authority would suffice.164  After determining who
the department head is, that department head should consistently
be the one to assert the privilege as the O’Neill standard
suggests.165
The application of the deliberative process privilege can be
complex and requires an amount of discretion from the courts to
determine what is deliberative and what is decisional or factual.166
When the court gives too much deference to a government agency,
then the result can be a blanket and arbitrary assertion of the privi-
lege over unprivileged documents leaving litigants bereft of their
due discovery.167
Courts should not waive the department head requirement
even where in camera review is a viable and applicable option.  The
purpose of the department head requirement is not only to ensure
that the government asserts the privilege properly, but to hold de-
partment heads accountable for when it is not.168
despite not having personally reviewed the considered documents), with United
States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 1980).
164. See Narayan, supra note 12, at 1203, 1206.
165. United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 1980).
166. See supra Part III.A.
167. See, e.g., Smith v. Rogers, No. 3:15-cv-264, 2017 WL 544598, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. July 10, 2017).
168. See supra Parts II.B., III.A.
